
2004 Antispam Roundup

with a focus on Sender Authentication Schemes and a sneak peek at a Next-Generation Email Architecture



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Visiting Fellow, Earthlink
Senior Technical Advisor,
Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group

December 10th 2004 at Infocomm Development Authority Singapore

Current Symptoms

- commercial spam (buy Cialis! Viagra!)
- 419 scams (Hi, I am ex-President Tofu's wife, I need your help to move \$50 million)
- phishing (please enter your credit card number and all your personal information)
- worms & viruses
- 80% of all email
- big problem
- at the ITU, delegate from Syria complained loudly about spam
- many developing countries have less bandwidth than Hotmail

What's the threat model?

- Internet email is wonderful because anyone can send mail to you for free
- Internet email is terrible because anyone can send mail to you for free
- email can contain anything
- once humans see an eBay logo they ignore everything else
- humans like to open attachments and click on links
- this is how humans work, there's no use complaining that people are gullible

What's the immediate concern?

- lots of money spent on bandwidth, cpu, disk, Brightmail, antispam solutions
- lots of money lost in productivity by people deleting spam by hand
- lots of intangible costs in missed communications due to poor integrity and reliability
- antispam is a \$2bn/year industry and growing
- that's great for antispam companies, but society shouldn't have to bear that cost

What's the strategic concern?


- not that individual victims lose thousands of dollars on scams and identity theft
- not that banks lose hundreds of millions of dollars on fraud
- the real problem is that people might give up on email
- society has invested a lot of money in ecommerce, especially banks
- banks saved a lot of money on ATMs.
- banks hope to save just as much money on Internet banking
- banks have spent billions of dollars reinventing themselves for the Internet
- phishing undermines consumer confidence
- billions of dollars wasted

Current solutions

- content filtering, Brightmail, Postini, Cloudmark, Ciphertrust, Mailfrontier, etc. etc. etc.
- 80 to 90% effective
- costs roughly \$1/user/month
- they are collecting a nice tax on email
- also the operating and capital expense of running lots of CPUs
- 90% is not good enough
- there is no such thing as a small security hole
- the antispam vendors push out a new rule
- spammers respond within 4 hours
- cannot fight an arms race

Small Town Philosophy

- email was invented in the 1980s. mostly geeks online
- "let's get the mail through". hence open relays, hence spam.
- functionality before security
- leave your doors unlocked
- greet people on the street





The Internet is now a Big City


- lock your doors
- don't talk to strangers
- frown at everyone
- if someone wants to talk to you, they need to be introduced.













block "Viagra" block .EXE





block "Viagra" block .EXE block Nigerian 419







block "Viagra" block make money fast block .EXE block fake Citibank block Nigerian 419


























inbox

accept from whitelisted senders (addressbook) accept from well known senders (reputation)
















Reject by default!








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
Spamproof











Backward compatibility mode enables gradual transition














present day, 2004




near future, 2005




medium future, 2006



far future, 2007....






close the Junk Folder and the Legacy Inbox

If you want to stop getting spam, you have to stop accepting mail from strangers.

"The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them."

If you try to solve spam, you end up with things like content filtering and quarantine folders.

Spam is a phase to be outgrown. Change people's expectations. They are ready.



Reversals from the Paradigm Shift

The opposite of every great idea is another great idea. -Niels Bohr

In the 21st century, if a message is not from an accountable sender, it should expect to be rejected. Senders must be authenticated. Senders must also be known, reputable, or accredited.

20th century email		21st century email
The average message is good. Spam is the exception.	7	The average message is spam. Ham is the exception.
By default, accept a message unless we have a good reason to reject it.	2	By default, reject a message unless we have a good reason to accept it.
Spammers evolve. The list of reasons to reject a message keeps growing.	3	Good senders are relatively static. The list of reasons to accept a message stays short.
Filter out spam based on content.	4	Filter in ham based on sender.
File suspected spam to a spam folder.	5	There is no spam folder.
Spamfolders reduce reliability. Senders have to ask "did you get my mail?"	6	If a message is accepted, senders can be confident it will be read.
The biggest challenge in solving spam is reducing false positives.	7	If we can solve false positives perfectly, spam is solved as a side effect.
End-users can send mail through any SMTP server, as anyone.	8	End-users have to phone home using 587 AUTH and send mail as themselves.
Expectation: strangers can email each other totally out of the blue.	9	Expectation: strangers need to be generally reputable or else be introduced.
Corporations, particularly sales accounts, are very sensitive to FPs, so the "default accept" paradigm will never go away entirely.	10	Humans, particularly children, are much more sensitive to false negatives, so "default reject" will eventually become dominant.

The two paradigms will coexist for quite some time.

Mail that passes the 21st century challenge may end up in a "first-class" folder, giving it attention priority from the end-user.

Mail that does not meet 21st century criteria will be subject to the gauntlet of 20th century antispam techniques,
and runs a greater risk of being filed (by mistake) to the spamfolder.

The two basic questions

- 1) Do I recognize you? (Hi, Mom!)
- 2) Are you really who you say you are? (Hey, you're not actually my mother.)

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"Are you a stranger?"

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- actually a very fine-grained question
- have I sent mail to you before?
- are you in my addressbook?
- are you in my friends' addressbooks?
- are you in my ISP's whitelist?
- are you in a global reputation system?
 (e.g. rating.cloudmark.com)
- have you been accredited?(e.g. Bonded Sender or Habeas)

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- these reduce to the First Contact problem
- we value getting mail from strangers
- spammers will pretend to be strangers
- this is why we haven't solved spam yet

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We want to make it hard for bad guys, easy for good guys.

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- 2) Are you really who you say you are?

 (Hey, you're not actually my mother.)

 Sender Authentication

How can we authenticate senders?

IP-based schemes

Is the SMTP client a designated MX?

Forwarders need to do SRS.

Mailing lists don't have to do anything.

Cryptography Is the signature valid?

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What identity do we authenticate?

Return-Path

RFC2821

Identity = sender
Goal: stop joe-jobs
and reject spam before DATA

Header From:

RFC2822

Identity = author
Goal: stop phishing
and verify user-visible
authorship information

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
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Mailing lists need to preserve content integrity.



DomainKeys, IIM PGP, S/MIME, etc

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
RFC2821


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
Header From:

RFC2822

Identity = author
Goal: stop phishing
and verify user-visible
authorship information







Many Identities, Many Proposals...

MTAMark, Selective Sender

evaluate(client-ip)

CSV, SPF run against the HELO

spf_evaluate(client-ip, helo-domain)

SPF Classic

spf_evaluate(client-ip, return-path)

SPF run against the headers = **SenderID**

spf_evaluate(client-ip, PRA)

Yahoo! DomainKeys, Cisco IIM, crypto

evaluate(From header, content)

TCP/IP provides client-ip

HELO mx.example.com

MAIL FROM:<user@example.com>
RCPT TO:<recipient>
DATA

Sender: <user@example.com>

From: <user@example.com>

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- Six months of bickering followed

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"Children, what's your favourite colour?"

- "Blue!"
- "Yellow!"
- "No, you're wrong!"
- "No, you're stupid!"

also known as "My saliva tastes better than yours"

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- laws are like sausage: you don't want to see how they're made



- March 2004, MARID working group formed
- Six months of bickering followed
- laws are like sausage: you don't want to see how they're made
- the sausage exploded in October
- "No consensus: let the market decide."



Why did MARID fail?

- "here are six proposals, let's choose the best one"
- "everybody fight"
- "oh, look, there's no consensus."

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
Project Cheeseplate: learning from MARID's mistakes

- "here are six proposals, let's do them all"
- "everybody play nicely together"
- not everybody will like everything
- as long as everybody likes something




Sender Authentication bottom line:

- SPF is the most widely adopted technology to date
- 20% of all internet email is covered by SPF records
- most MTA and antispam products can check SPF
- Microsoft expected to go live with Sender ID in Hotmail, Outlook, Exchange
- Cryptographic solutions still maturing: people want DK and IIM to merge
- Members of MAAWG have agreed to publish SPF records by end Q4 2004
- MAAWG collectively covers about 250 million mailboxes (http://www.maawg.org/)



This stuff is actually working.



Next Steps

- everybody publish SPF records today
- expect to do other things as well, including crypto
- receivers should start using SPF results as part of a spam scoring solution
- opensource: upgrade your MTAs or download patches
- commercial MTAs: ask your vendor about SPF and other antispam standards
- forwarding and hosting providers need to think about SRS and header prepending
- whitepaper has specific deployment advice. http://spf.pobox.com/whitepaper.pdf

Collaboration and Industry Involvement

- APCAUCE in Kyoto 18–25 Feb http://www.apricot.net/
- ISPcon and Inbox Event in 2005
- ISPs consider joining MAAWG http://www.MAAWG.org/
- if you run an opensource MTA, help fund development of Cheeseplate
- (SPF project budget to date: US\$3,000)

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THANK YOU!

http://spf.pobox.com/

http://spf.pobox.com/whitepaper.pdf

http://spf.pobox.com/slides/20041210-sg/

http://inbox.mengmail.com/

mengwong@pobox.com